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Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience
How is it that we can perceive, learn and be aware of the world? The development of new techniques for studying large-scale brain activity, together with insights from computational modeling and a better understanding of cognitive processes, have opened the door for collaborative research that could lead to major advances in our understanding of ourselves.
N
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of trying t o understand how the mind-brain works. In the past, discovcrics at the ~lcuro~lal levcl and explanations at the cognitive l e~~c l were so distant that each often secmcd of rrlercly academic significance t o the other. Symbol processing models based on the digital computer have been unpromising as a means to bridge the gap between neuroscience and cognitive science, because they did not relate to what was known about nervous systems at the level of signal processing. However, there is now a gathering conviction arnong scic~ltists that the time is right for a fruitful convergence of rcscarch from hitlicrto isolated fields. The rcsearch strategy devcloping in cognitive ncuroscicncc is neither exclusively from the top down, nor exclusi~~cly from the bottom up. Rather, it is a coc~~olu-~ -P. S. (:hurclil,ind is in tlie Dep'~rtmcnt ot' Philosophy at the University ot'(:alifbrnia at Sat1 lhcgo. La Jolla. CA 92093. T. J. Scjnowski is at '1'11~Salk Institutc, La Joll'~, (:A 92093, dnd in thc I)cp'~rtmcnt of Uiology, University of (:'~liti~rnia at S,in l)icgo, 1.a Jolla. CA 92093.
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tionary strategy, typified by interaction among rcsearch domains, whcrc research at OIIC level pr~vides co~~straints, correctio~ls, and inspiration for rcsearch at other Ic\~cIs ( 1 ) .
Levels
There arc in circulation at least three different notions of the term "lcvcls," as it is used to describe scientific research, each notion cawing the landscape in a ditfercnt way-lcvels of analysis, lcvcls of organization, and levels of processing. Lellc.13 ojnric~lysi~ the concepmal division of a phenomenon cconccr~~ in terms of different classcs of cluestions that can be asked about it. A framework articulated by Marr ~11d Poggio (2) drew upon the conception of levels in computer science and identified three levels: (i) the cornputational level of abstract problern ~~lalysis, decomposing the task into its main constituents (for example, determination of the three-dimetisiotial strtlcturc of a rnoving object from succcssivc views); (ii) the Icvcl of the algorithm, specifying a forrnal procedure to perform the task by providing the correct output for a given input; and (iii) the level of physical implementation. Marr ( 3 ) maintained that cornputational problerrls of the highest levcl could be analyzed independently of understanding the algorithm that performs the computation. Similarly, lie thought the algoritllmic problem of the second level was solvable indcpendcntly of understanding its physical irnplcmentation.
Some investigators have used the doctrine of independence to conclude that neuroscience is irrelevant t o undcrstanding cognition. h r yellow versus hlue, one for red versus green, and a separate system h r black versus white (13 (17), and theorists, who have modeled them (18) . Color constancy depends on being able to cornpute the intrinsic reflectance of a surface independently of the incident light. The reflectance of a patch of surface can be approximately computed l,y comparing the enerLgy in wavelength bands coming from the patch of surface to the average energy in these bands from neighbori~~g and distant regions of the vis~~al field. The signature of a color-sensitive neuron that was perfomling this computation would be a long-range s~~ppressive influence from regions of the visual field outside the conventional The third example of a link benvecn brain and cognition comes from research on liow form, motion, and color information are processed in the v i s~~a l system. If diff'erent parts of the system are specialized for diffkre~it tasks, for example, for rnotion or color, the11 there should be conditions ~~n d e r are which these specializations revealed. Suppose the "color system" is good at distinguishing colors, but not much else, and, in particular, is poor at deterrriining shape, depth, and motion, whereas the "shape system" is not sensitive to color differences but to brigllt~iess differences. When boundaries are rr~arked only by color differences-all diffkrences in brightness are experimentally rernoved-shape detection should be impaired. l'sycl~ophysical research has shown that this is illdeed the case. The perceived rnotion of ecluiluminant contours is degraded (22); for111 cues such as shape-frorn-shading are diffic~~lt to interpret (2.9, and perceived depth in random-dot stereograms collapses (24). l'llysiological and a~iatomical research has begun to Luncover a possible explanation for these phenomena (2.5). The separate processing streams in cerebral cortex mentioned earlier carry visual information about diCerent properties of objects (6, 26). In particular tlie predominant pathway for color infornlation diverges from those carrying infornlation o n motion and depth (Fig. 2) . The separation is not perfect, however, but equiluminant stirriuli provide physiologists with a v i s~~a l "scalpel" for tracking down the correlates of perceptual coherence in diffkrent v i s~~a l areas. Thc lessons learned from color perception may have significance for studying other cognitive domains. So far as we know only a small fraction of the lieurolls in tlie visual system respond in a way that corresponds t o our perceptual report of color. The locations in the brain where links between pllysiological states and perceptual states can be found vary from the retina to deep in the visual system for ditferent aspects of color perception (2'7). New experimental techniclues will be needed t o study these links when the information is encoded in a large population of interacting neurons (10, 28) .
Techniques and Research Strategies
Color vision is a problem that has been studied for hundreds of years; we know much less about tlie biological basis of other perceptual and cognitive states. Fortunately, new techniclues, such as regional blood Now analysis with positron ernission tomography (I'E1') and rnagnetic resollalice imaging (MKI) are becorning available for noninvasively measuring brain activity in hurna~is. With these techniques the large-scale pattern of what is happening where and when in the brain can be determined; later, as techniques with higher resolution are developed they can be focused on the relevant arcas to ask how the processing is acco~nplislled.
A useful way to get an overview of the assorted techniclues is to graph them with respect to ternporal and spatial resolution. This permits us to identi+ areas where there d o not yet exist techniclues to get access to levels of organization at those spatio-tempera1 resolutions and to compare their strengths and weaknesses (Fig. 3) . For example, it is apparent that we lack detailed information about proccssing in neural networks within cortical layers and columns over a wide range of time scales, from milliseconds to hours. There is also a pressing need for experimental techniques designed to address the dendritic and synaptic level of investigation in cerebral cortex.
Without these data it will not be possible to develop realistic models of information processing in cortical circuits.
Although we need experimental data concerning the properties of neurons and behavioral data about psychological capacities, we also need to find models that explain how patterns of activity in neurons represent surfaces, optical flow, and objects; how networks develop and learn, store, and retrieve information; and how networks accomplish sensorimotor and other types of integration. Ideally, modeling and experimental research will have a symbiotic relationship, such that each informs, corrects, and inspires the other.
Although many diverse kinds of things are presented as models for some part of the nervous system, it is usehl to distinguish between realistic models, which are genuinely and strongly predictive of some aspect of nervous system dynamics or anatomy, and simplifying models, which though not so predictive, demonstrate that the nervous system could be governed by specific principles.
Connectionist network models (29), which are simplifying models, are typically motivated by cognitive phenomena and are governed primarily by computational constraints, while honoring very general neurobiological constraints such as number of processing units and time required to perform a task. Accordingly, they are more properly considered demonstrations of what could be possible and sometimes what is not possible. Realistic models of actual neural networks, by contrast, are primarily motivated by biological constraints, such as the physiological and anatomical properties of specific cell types (30). Despite their different origins and sources of dominant constraints, simplifying models and realistic neural models are both based on the mathematics of nonlinear dynamical systems in high-dimensional spaces (31). The common conceptual and technical tools used in these models should provide links between two rich sources of experimental data, and consequently, connectionist and neural models have the potential to coevolve toward an integrated, coherent account of information processing in the mind-brain.
The ultimate goal of a unified account does not require that it be a single model that spans all the levels of organization. Instead the integration will probably consist of a chain of models linking adjacent levels. When one level is explained in terms of a lower level, this does not mean that the higher level theory is useless or that the high-level phenomena no longer exist. On the contrary, explanations will coexist at all levels, as they do in chemistry and physics, genetics, and embryology.
Conclusions
It would be convenient if we could understand the nature of cognition without understanding the nature of the brain itself. Unfortunately, it is difficult if not impossible to theorize effectively on these matters in the absence of neurobiological constraints. The primary reason is that computational space is consummately vast, and there are many conceivable solutions to the problem of how a cognitive operation could be accomplished. Neurobiological data provide essential constraints on computational theories, and they consequently provide an efficient means for narrowing the search space. Equally important, the data are also richly suggestive in hints of space, typically 10 to 50 pm on a side. The horizontal axis represents the minimum and maximum time intervals over which information can be collected with the technique. Thus, action potentials from a single neuron can be recorded with millisecond accuracy over many hours. Patch-clamp recording allows the ionic currents through single ionic channels to be measured. Optical and fluorescent dyes that can reveal membrane potential, ionic concentrations, and intraDendr cellular structure have been used with high resolution in tissue culture, where it is possible to obtain a clear view of single cells (37, 38). However, recordings from the central nervous system are limited in resolution by the optical properties of nervous tissue and only about 0.1-mm resolution has been achieved (39). Confocal microscopy is a recent development in light microscopy that could be used for improving the resolution of the technique for three-dimensional specimens (40) .
ERP (evoked response potential) and MEG
(magnetoencephalography) record the average electrical and magnetic activity over large brain regions and are limited to events that take place over about 1 s (41). The temporal resolution of PET (positron emission tomography) depends on the lifetime of the isotope being used, which ranges from minutes to an hour. It may be possible to achieve a temporal resolution of seconds with ''0 to study fast changes in blood flow by using temporal binning of the gamma ray events (equivalent to the poststimulus time histogram for action potentials) (42). The 2-deoxyglucose (2-DG) technique has a time resolution of about 45 min and a spatial resolution of 0.1 mm with large pieces of tissue and 1 pm with small pieces of tissue (43). The 2-DG technique can also be applied to humans with PET (44 Accordingly, despite the fact that the brain is experimentally demanding, basic ~~curobiology is indispensable in the task of discovering the theories that explain how we perform such acti\' 11tles as ' seeing, thinking, and being aware.
On the other hand, the possibility that c o g~~i t i o~~ will be an open book once we understand the details of each and every neuron and its development, connectivity, and response properties is likewise misco~lccived. Even if we could simulate, synapse for synapse, our entire II~I-VOLIS system, that accomplishment, by itself, would not be the same as understanding how it works. The simulatio~~ might be just as much of a mystery as the function of the brain currently is, for it may reveal nothing about the network and systcrns properties that hold the key to cognitive effects. Even simulations of small network models have capabilities that are difficult to understand (-32) . Genuine theorizing about the naturc of neurocomp~~tation is therefore essential.
Many major questions remain to be answered. Although some problems in vision, learning, attention, and scnsorirnotor control are yielding, this will be harder to achieve for more complex psychological phenomena such as reasoning and language. Nonetheless, once we understand some filndarnental principles of brain function, we may see how to reformulate the outstanding problems and address them in ways that are irnpossiblc now t o predict. Whatever the outcome, the results are likely to surprise us. 18. E. 11. 1,<111ci. 1+111, ,4(,11i, .Sii 83. 3078 (19861: 11.FIilrlL>c~-t I.cclcrc, liivoi Op/l/h,i/mo/. Slrppl. 26, 282 (1985) . 24 . C. 1. 11 and 1). 11. Fcncicr, ihld. 11,482 (1972 Rnlchlc. l'r,riil\ .\c,i~ni.ii 9 , 525 (1986 Science, New Series, Vol. 242, No. 4879. (Nov. 4, 1988) , pp. 741-745. 
